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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
M. B. POWERS, JAMES M. POWERS
and VERN PETERSEN, d/b/a
POWERS AND PETERSEN,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.
GENE'S BUILDING MATERIALS,
INC.,

Case No. 14812

Defendant and
Appellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for damages arising from a breach of
contract and from the negligent handling by Appellant of Respondents'
account which Respondents had with Appellant for the purchase of
certain building materials.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft presiding.

A verdict was returned in favor of Respondents
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in the sum of $11, 679. 45 and judg:c.e!'.t '.-:as er,ter-ed ther-eori b:,·
Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT

O~

APPEAL

Respondents seek an affirmation of the verdict a!'.d
judgment.

STATE~1E~T

OF FACTS

On or about April 30, 1973, Respondents entered i!'.tc
a contract with Jim Hartwell and Clearfield Realty for the
construction of two six-plexes in Brigham City, Utah (Ex. 1-P).
On or about May 7, 1973, Eldon Weber, president of Gene's
Building Materials, Inc., Glen Campbell, secretary and treasure:
of Gene's, and Jim Hartwell traveled to Brigham City and met wi::
Respondent Jim Powers (R. 158, 185 and 196).

At said meeting,

a letter was delivered by Appellant's officers to Respondent
Jim Powers offering to furnish Respondents building materials
for Respondents' twelve-unit apartment house at a guaranteed :;::>
provided Respondents would pre-pay Appellant for said materials
(R. 159-60 and Ex. 2-P).
Said agreement was between Respondents an_d Appellant
only since Clearfield Realty was not mentioned in said letter
and Hartwell and his wife were merely mentioned for the purpose
of being authorized to specify which materials would be neede)
on the Brigham City job (Ex. 2-P).

Note should be made that
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said letter was addressed to "~!r. Bud Powers and Whomever else
concerned" and signed by "Eldon E.

\~eber,

Pres.".

At the conclusion of the meeting in Powers' office
in Brigham City, Powers issued a chit authorizing the Box Elder
County Bank to pay Gene's $54,000.00 for materials to be
furnished on the Brigham City job (Ex. 3-P).

Said bank received

a Receipt and Lien Release signed by Gene's Building Materials Glen D. Ca.mpbell, Sec.

(Ex. 3-P).

The bank then delivered to

Weber and Campbell a cashier's check payable to Gene's Building
~!aterials

in the sum of $54,000.00 (Ex. 4-P).
Appellant's officers, after receiving the cashier's

check and before leaving Brigham City, drove to the proposed
construction site to view the same (R. 186 and 210).
Prior to obtaining Respondents' job, Hartwell had
a general account with Gene's set up as "Jim Hartwell, 402 W.
2200 N., Sunset, Utah"

(R. 198 and Ex. 7-P).

After Appellant's officers returned to Salt Lake City,
a new account was set up in the name of "Jim Hartwell,
Brigham City Apartments" and the said $54,000.00 was deposited
therein

(R. 198 and Ex. 9-P).
Appellant immediately started furnishing materials

on the Brigham City job with the first invoice dated May 9,
1973 and billed to "Jim Hartwell, Brigham City Apts." (Ex. 5-P).
Said job proceeded as agreed until September, 1973 when
Appellant began running Hartwell's other jobs through the
Brigham City account (R. 163-4 and Ex. 6-P).

Said spurious
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-4jobs were located in Kaysville, Layton, Riverdale and Clearfield
and were processed through the Brigham City account by Appellant
without Respondents' permission (R. 160-1 and Ex. 6-P).
This problem was further compounded when Appellant,
on September 14, 1973, transferred $1,901.28 from the Brigham
City account to Hartwell's general account paying off the
entire outstanding balance in the said general account (Exs. 7-P
and 9-P) .
The only excuse Appellant could give for such unauthorize:I
activity was that Hartwell had called Eldon Weber and requested
that the accounts be consolidated

(R. 199).

,

Weber then advised

the bookkeeper to take care of the consolidation (R. 199).

It

should be noted at this point that the president of the company
implemented the unauthorized account consolidation (R. 199).
Weber knew that the said $54,000.00 was to be used
for materials in the Brigham City job as the following testimony
indicates

(R. 202) :

"Q.
Did you know what the $54,000.00 was to be for
specifically?
A. As far as I knew, the materials for the
Brigham City apartments."
Weber further admitted that the Brigham Ci_ty job was
not the usual situation where the lumber company dealt with the
contractor and not the property owners and where the lumber
company looked to the contractor for the payment of the materials
(R. 208-9).
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-5The unauthorized use of the said $54,000.00 is further
highlighted by Weber's testimony as follows

(R. 210):

"Q.
There is no question in your mind that you were
on notice what this money was for, is there?
A.

Yes, I realized it was for the apartment house."

When Hartwell requested that the accounts be combined,
Appellant did not notify Respondents that Respondents' money was
now being used for Hartwell's other jobs (R. 212).
Construction on the Brigham City job commenced May,
1973 and was completed on or about March, 1974 (R. 170).

In

the interim, Hartwell left the Brigham City job during the first
part of 1974

(R. 175).

Respondent M. B. Powers had advised his

brother, Respondent James M. Powers, that he had notified
Appellant of Hartwell's dismissal from the job (R. 176).
After Hartwell had left the job, Clearfield Realty
sent a man up to the Brigham City job a few times after which
Clearfield Realty discontinued working on the job and Respondents
completed the job about March, 1974 (R. 170 and 219).
Respondents did not join Hartwell and Clearfield Realty
as defendants in the subject litigation since Hartwell's
whereabouts were unknown and no dispute existed between
Respondents and Clearfield Realty (R. 130).

The prime

construction contract called for a purchase price of
$149,340.00 and the apartment complex ultimately cost approximately
$199,000.00

(R. 123 and Ex. 1-P).

Further, Respondents had

finished the construction of the project themselves.

Therefore,
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in order to resolve the matter, Edwin Higley, Clearfield Realty
and Respondents entered into a subsequent agreement (R. 123).
In the spring of 1974, Respondents went to Appellant's
place of business in Salt Lake City and requested the balance
of their account assuming that they had a credit balance (R.
170).

The account showed no credit balance and suit was commenced

on July 15, 1974 (R. 1 and Ex. 9P).
At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated
that $11,679.45 was the value of the materials not used on
the Brigham City job (R. 155).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE HAD NO DUTY TO DISQUALIFY HIMSELF
IN PRESIDING OVER THE SUBJECT LITIGATION.
The Record is silent as to when counsel for Appellant
was notified by the court clerk of the judge assigned to try
the case.

All we have is counsel's assertion that he learned

of the judge assignment approximately 15 minutes before trial
commenced.

Counsel for Respondents was not a party to any

conversation between Judge Bryant H. Croft and counsel for
Appellant concerning a disqualification of Judge Croft.
The Record is silent as to any written or oral motions
for a continuance of the trial or a change of trial judge.
Therefore, counsel for Respondents has obtained from the court
clerk a letter dated March 17, 1977 setting forth the practice
of assigning cases to judges in the Third Judicial District .
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-7Said letter is attached to Respondents' Brief and marked Exhibit A.
It is also the recollection of counsel for Respondents that he
received notification of the judge assignment on the day prior
to trial.
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that whenever a party desires to disqualify a judge from trying
a matter, the party must:
1. File an affidavit of bias or prejudice, as soon as
practicable after the case has been assigned, setting
forth the facts and reasons for the belief that such
bias and prejudice exists;
2. File with said affidavit a certificate of counsel
of record that such affidavit and applicatfon are made
in good faith.
Respondents assert that there is nothing in the record
that can be reviewed by an appellate court.

There is no affidavit

of bias or prejudice, no certificate of good faith, and no
written or oral motions for a continuance or for change of
trial judge.
Counsel for Appellant practices law in the Third Judicial
District and was aware of the practice of the clerk of the court
in assigning judges the day before trial.

Counsel was also aware

that Judge Croft was a possible judge to be assigned to the case
and could have either called the clerk's office the afternoon before
trial or had an affidavit of prejudice ready in the event Judge
Croft was assigned to the case.

Counsel had a further alternative

of making an oral motion for the record requesting that a new
judge be assigned to the case and giving his reasons therefor.
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As the record now stands, there is no showing of bias or
and no basis for removing Judge Croft from the case.

prejudi~

There was

nothing before the court to transfer to another judge.
In Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 242 P.2d 297 (Utah 1952),
where an affidavit of prejudice was filed after the trial had
commenced and pertained to matters alleged to have existed long
before the trial and a statement by the court during the trial,
the Supreme Court of Utah observed:
"Under these circumstances, the filing of such
affidavit was untimely and hence Rule 63(b)URCP,
was not violated.
This is particularly true in
view of the fact that the evidence supported the
decree regardless of any statements made by the
court."
In the case at bar, the trial had not yet commenced
when counsel for Appellant conversed with Judge Croft in chambers.
It is difficult to see how there could be any basis for bias or
prejudice by Judge Croft in the subject case.
In Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P.~
534, this Court held that before a judge should be ~isqualifi~
from a case an affidavit of prejudice should be filed setting
forth the facts and reasons for the belief that such bias and
prejudice exists.

This Court further indicated that the reasons

alleged must be "reasonable" reasons.

It was then observed

at page 536 of the opinion:
"We detect nothing in the Record, either before or
after the affidavit, evincing any rancor of any . .
kind on the part of the trial court, but contrariwise,
only the application of what we believe to have
been sound legal principles."
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The matter at bar was tried before a jury and the
record is replete with Judge Croft's rulings and instructions
in the case.

Respondents submit that there is no indication

in the Record showing bias or prejudice against Appellant by
the Court.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Appellant argues that it should be granted a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence that one Edwin Higley
of Clearfield Realty had entered into a settlement agreement
with Respondents.
Rule 59(4)URCP, regarding grounds for a new trial,
provides as follows:
"Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced
at the trial."
A multitude of cases hold that whether to grant a new
trial for newly discovered evidence is wholly within the trial court's
discretion and is conclusive unless the discretion is abused.
See Greco v. Gentile, 53 P.2d 1155.
It is also axiomatic that if a party does not exercise
diligence to discover and produce the alleged newly discovered
evidence at the trial, the motion for a new trial should not
prevail.

See Shields v. Ekman, 248 P. 122.
Respondents submit that Appellant with reasonable
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-10prior to the time of trial and could have also joined Clearfield
Realty and Hartwell if Appellant so desired.
The approach of Appellant in preparing the subject
case for trial is set forth in counsel's remarks during argument
of the motion for new trial

(R. 228):

"I don't think on a collection case such as this,
Your Honor, a deposition is justified."
At the time Respondents' counsel deposed the officers
of Appellant, Respondent Jim Powers was present in the office
of Appellant's counsel and Appellant chose not to take his
deposition (R. 232).
Respondents took two depositions and served two sets
of Interrogatories on Appellant (R. 9, 14 and 15).
The subject suit was filed on July 15, 1974 and tried
September 1, 1976 (R. 1 and 64).

During this time, Appellant

chose to take no depositions and to serve only one set of
Interrogatories which were filed on February 11, 1976 and the
Answers thereto filed on April 21, 1976 (R. 49 and.56).
In Respondents' Answers to Interrogatories (R. 56),
Appellant was advised as follows:
a.

A copy of the prime contract was attached

setting forth that Jim Hartwell and Clearfield Realty were the
contractors.
b.

Jim Hartwell, Clearfield Realty and Respondents

were listed as performing work on the Brigham City job.
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-11If Appellant did not desire to pursue further discovery,
possibly a visit to Clearfield Realty prior to trial would have
been in order.

After a discussion with Clearfield Realty,

Appellant then had the option of joining Hartwell and Clearfield
Realty, or either of them, in the subject lawsuit.
Appellant could have moved under the provisions of
Rule 19(b) or Rule 20(a) URCP to join Hartwell and/or
Clearfield Realty.
Appellant also could have proceeded under Rule 21 URCP
which provides as follows:
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for di~missal
of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by
order of the Court on motion of any party or of
its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
party may be severed and proceeded with separately."
Appellant had the further option of proceeding under
Rule 14 URCP which authorizes third-party practice and would
have allowed Appellant to bring in Hartwell and/or Clearfield
Realty as third-party defendants.

However, Appellant chose to

do none of this and was content to wait until after an adverse
verdict and judgment to assert these rights.
It should further be noted that Appellant still has
the option of proceeding against Hartwell and/or

Clearfield Realty

in an independent action.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12The trial judge observed at page 230 of the Record
as follows:
"You could have brought in Clearfield, as well as
anybody, and Hartwell, too, you see. You have that
right under the law, but you didn't do so. Now,
the reason why the plaintiffs' get a judgment
against Gene's is because they can show only that
instead of $54,000.00 worth of materials being
delivered to the Brigham City project for Hartwell,
they delivered only about $40,000.00 for it. And
other deliveries to Hartwell made by Gene's and
charged against the credit of the plaintiffs are
for other jobs that Hartwell had and your own records
show that. And so, all they are saying is, 'We gave
you $54,000.00 for materials and you only gave us
$40,000.00 worth of materials. We want our money
back we didn't get our materials for.' And that is
all this lawsuit was about, as far as this Court
is concerned."
The Court further observed at page 231 of the Record:
"Any judgment is based upon the lawsuit before
me, not upon the fact you may or may not have had
a valid suit against Clearfield.
I think the reason
you have a suit against Hartwell and Clearfield is
that they bought goods from you and didn't pay you
for it; but instead, by a telephone call, gets you
to join two accounts and credit the plaintiffs'
credit with your company on their purchases for
materials for other jobs.
"Now, it is between the plaintiffs and the defendant,
it seems to me. The defendant is going to have to
get stuck for giving Hartwell and Clearfield credit
that was due the plaintiffs, but they used it up giving
Hartwell materials for other jobs. Because I think,
you have a claim against Clearfield and Hartwell,
is simply because they purchased materials from yo~
that they didn't pay you for. And instead of looking
to them for credit, you charged the credit of the
plaintiffs for those materials. So, I think your
claim against Clearfield and Hartwell is for goods
sold and delivered."
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-13POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY.
At page 218 of the Record the Court observed as
follows:
"I would simply say in the Record, that after
considering the evidence in the case and in connection
with my preparation of the Instruction, it is my
opinion that neither estoppel or contributory
negligence are proper issues to be submitted to
the Jury in the case."
The evidence believed by the jury and the Court was
that the Brigham City job commenced May, 1973, Hartwell left
the job during the first part of 1974, Respondents completed
the job during March of 1974 and contacted Appellant concerning
the balance of their account.

Further, there is some indication

that M. B. Powers notified Appellant when Hartwell left the
job (R. 176).

Respondent James Powers testified that he had

not personally notified Appellant of Hartwell's departure but
that his brother had notified Appellant of said departure.

This

negates Appellant's argument that Respondents waited an unreasonably
long time. Appellant's argument is further negated by the fact that
the job was completed only a month or two before Respondents'
visit to Appellant in Salt Lake City concerning the .balance of
their account.
Appellant further argues that it is impossible for
Appellant to police individual accounts and that this could
raise the question of Respondents' contributory negligence.
This contention is not borne out by the evidence since the
i
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-14evidence was Hartwell talked with Eldon Weber, president of
Appellant, concerning combining the accounts and the president
of the company then arranged with the bookkeeper for the
combining of the accounts.
In Jury Instruction No. 10 (R. 104) the court presentec
Appellant's position in the case as follows:
"The defendant denies that it breached its contract
with plaintiffs and alleges that it delivered to
Hartwell the total amount of building materials
for which plaintiffs had paid defendant the advance
payment of $54,000.00 and- denies any responsibility
for the fact that Hartwell may have used some of
the materials so delivered on other jobs.
Defendant
further denies that i t was negligent in the keeping
of its books or records or that any negligence on
its part was a proximate cause of any damages
sustained by plaintiffs."
Appellant's position was further set forth in
Instruction No. 12 (R. 106) which provided as follows:
"It is the duty of a person who has been injured
by the negligence of another or damaged by a
breach of contract to use reasonable diligence
in caring for his injuries or damages and reasonable
means to prevent their aggravation and to effect
a recovery. Reasonable diligence and reasonable
means in such situations depend upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.
If one fails
to use reasonable diligence to care for his injuries
and they are aggravated as a result of such failure,
the liability of another, if any, must be limited
to the amount of damage that would have been suffered
if the injured person himself had exercised the
diligence required of him.
"Thus, at the time Hartwell terminated working on
the construction of the Brigham City apartments,
plaintiffs had a duty to advise defendant that
Hartwell had left the job and that no further
materials should be furnished to him for use on
the Brigham City apartments and charged against
that account. Having failed to notify defendant of
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-15such termination, any charges made after such
termination of goods to Hartwell for use on the
said apartments would not be chargeable to defendant."
Respondents submit that Appellant's position as justified
by the evidence was amply set forth by the Court.

CONCLUSION
Respondents submit that Appellant had its day in
court and that the verdict and judgment entered thereon should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD H. THORNLEY
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
2610 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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EXHIBIT "A"

W. STERLING EVANS
CLERK
PARKER ROBISON
CHIEF DEPUTY

OFFICE OF CLERK
P.O. BOX 1860, 240 EAST 4TH SOUTH

March 17th, 1977

Mr. Richard H. Thornley
Attorney at Law
2610 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to your request for information relative to procedures in
notifying counsel as to pending cases set for a specific date in
the Third Judicial District Court, please be advised the procedure
is set forth as follows:
On the day prior to the date on which cases are scheduled for trial,
the Docket Clerk and his Assistant make a determination as to which
cases are going to be tried and these cases are then assigned to a
particular Judge. Sometime between the hours of 3:00 P.M. and 5:00
P.M., respective counsel are notified by telephone by the said
Docket Clerk or his Assistant as to the name of the Judge assigned
to try the case and the time the case will commence.
With particular respect to the case of M. B. Powers, et al -vs- Gene's
Building Materials, Inc., Case No. 220946, which case was scheduled
for trial on September lst, 1976, it is the opinion of the undersigned
based on established·practice as outlined above, all counsel, to-wit,
Richard H. Thornley and Matt Biljanic, were notified on the day prior
to the trial which was set for September lst, 1976, at least one hour
prior to 5:00 P.M. as to the name of the Judge Assigned to try the
case, to-wit the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, and as to the time of trial,
which was ten o'clock A.M. Said notice would have been given to counsel
personally or by leaving word with a Secretary in the said Law Office.
Very truly yours,
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